People differ markedly in their views concerning the appropriate role of government in reducing economic inequality. Self-interest and differences in values explain part of the conflict over redistribution. But by far the most important fault line concerns not values at all, but rather facts. People hold different beliefs about why the rich are rich and the poor are poor. Those who think that "getting ahead and succeeding in life" depends on "hard work" or "willingness to take risks" tend to oppose redistributive programs. Conversely, those who think that the key to success is "money inherited from family," "parents and the family environment," "connections and knowing the right people," or being white, support redistribution (Fong 2001, Bowles, Fong and Gintis forthcoming).
No one doubts that the children of well-off parents generally receive more and better schooling and benefit from material, cultural, and genetic inheritances. But until recently, the consensus among economists has been that, in the United States, success is largely won or lost in every generation. Early research on the statistical relationship between parents' and their children's' economic status after becoming adults, starting with Blau and Duncan (1967) , found only a weak connection and thus seemed to confirm that the United States was indeed the "land of opportunity." For example, the simple correlations between parents' and sons' income or earnings (or their logarithms) in the United States reported by Becker and Tomes (1986) averaged 0.15, leading the authors to conclude: "Aside from families victimized by discrimination… [a] lmost all earnings advantages and disadvantages of ancestors are wiped out in three generations. " Becker (1988) expressed a widely held consensus when, in his presidential address to the American Economics Association, he concluded: " [L] ow earnings as well as high earnings are not strongly transmitted from fathers to sons."
But more recent research makes it clear that the estimates of such high levels of intergenerational mobility were artifacts of two types of measurement error: mistakes in reporting income, particularly when individuals were asked to recall the income of their parents, and transitory components in current income uncorrelated with underlying permanent income (Bowles 1972 , Bowles and Nelson 1974 , Atkinson, Maynard and Trinder 1983 , Solon 1992 , Zimmerman 1992 . The high noise-to-signal-ratio in both generations' incomes depressed the intergenerational correlation. When corrected, using a variety of methods and data sources, the intergenerational correlations for economic status now appear to be substantial, twice or three times the average of the U. S. studies surveyed by Becker and Tomes (1986) .
The upwards adjustment of the consensus estimates of the extent of intergenerational transmission of economic success has stimulated empirical research on the mechanisms accounting for parent-offspring similarity in economic status, including Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1995) , Mulligan (1997) , Solon (2000) and Björklund and Jäntti (2000) . The relevant facts on which most researchers agree include the following: brothers' incomes are much more similar than those of randomly chosen males of the same race and similar age differences; the income of identical twins are much more similar than fraternal twins or non-twin brothers; the children of well off parents obtain more and higher quality schooling; and wealth inheritance makes an important contribution to the wealth owned by the offspring of the very rich. On the basis of these and other empirical regularities, it seems safe this research, also available at http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/working-papers.html. Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2002b) presents a collection of recent empirical and theoretical research.
to conclude that the intergenerational transmission of economic status is accounted for not by a single channel but by a heterogeneous collection of mechanisms: the genetic and cultural transmission of such income-generating traits as cognitive functioning and noncognitive personality traits in demand by employers; the inheritance of wealth and income-enhancing group memberships such as race; and the superior education and health status enjoyed by the children of higher status families.
However, the transmission of economic success across generations remains something of a black box. We find that the combined inheritance processes operating through superior cognitive levels and educational attainments of those with well-off parents, while important, explain at most half of the intergenerational transmission of economic status. Moreover, while genetic transmission of earnings-enhancing traits appears to play a role, little of the intergenerational correlation is accounted for by the genetic transmission of IQ.
It might be thought that the black box is an artifact of poor measurement of the intervening variables relative to the earnings of parents and offspring. But this does not seem to be the case. Years of schooling and other measures of school attainment, like cognitive performance, are measured with relatively little error. Better measurements will of course help, but the fundamental problem is not due to measuring the right variables poorly, but to missing some of the important variables entirely.
Most economic models treat one's income as the sum of the returns to the factors of production one brings to the market, implying that the intergenerational transmission process can best be explained by studying the way that parental and offspring choices produce similarity in the vector of factors of production at the disposal of parents and their offspring. The most direct mechanism takes the form of bequests or inter-vivos transfers of income-producing assets, though for reasons we will explain, this channel has received little attention from students of intergenerational transmission. A more indirect mechanism (Becker 1975 , Mulligan 1997 involves parental and child investments in human capital, which account for parent child similarities in cognitive functioning and other skills that contribute to productive labor services.
Missing from this model are all of the determinants of individuals' incomes that are not found in the standard production function. Any individual trait that affects income and for which parent-offspring similarity is strong will contribute to the intergenerational transmission of economic success. Included are race, regional or urban rural location, height, beauty, or other aspects of physical appearance, health status, and personality. Some of these traits are acquired deliberately by individual choices, but others are more accurately attributed to genetic inheritance, circumstance, or the unintended consequences of parental and offspring choices.
Thus, by contrast to the standard approach, we give considerable attention to income-generating characteristics that may not have been chosen in the usual sense, and we present an accounting framework encompassing both production related attributes (e.g. wealth, skills) and other influences on earnings. We identify the importance of various channels, in many cases using approximations that, while reasonable, are far from precise. We find that our estimates of the empirical contribution of a channel to the intergenerational transmission process bears little relationship to the amount of attention given these channels in the scholarly literature. Cognitive skills have been greatly over-studied by this measure, while wealth, race, and non-cognitive behavioral traits have been understudied.
Measuring the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Status
Economic status can be measured in discrete categories-by membership in hierarchically ordered classes, for example-or continuously, by earnings, income, and occupational prestige index, or wealth. The discrete approach allows a rich but difficult-to-summarize representation of the process of intergenerational persistence of status using transition probabilities among the relevant social ranks (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) . By contrast, continuous measures allow a simple metric of persistence, based on correlations between the economic status of the two generations. Moreover these correlations may be decomposed into additive components reflecting the various causal mechanisms accounting for parent child economic similarity. Both approaches are insightful, but for simplicity of presentation we confine ourselves to continuous measurement of status. We use subscript p to refer to parental measures, while y is an individual's economic status, adjusted so that its mean,ȳ, is that of the parental generation, β y is a constant, y p is the individual's parental y, and y is a disturbance uncorrelated with y p . Thus
that is, the deviation of the offspring's income from the mean income is β y times the deviation of the parent from mean income, plus an error term. We will term β y the "Galton measure" of intergenerational persistence. (Francis Galton (1889) estimated its value to be one-third for the transmission of height from parents to sons.). In the empirical work reviewed below, earnings, income, wealth and other measures of economic success are measured by their natural logarithm unless otherwise noted. Thus, β y is the percentage change in offspring's economic success associated with a 1 percent change in parents' economic success. The influence of mean income on the income of the offspring, 1−β y is called regression to the mean, since it shows that one may expect to be closer to the mean than one's parents by the fraction 1 − β y (Goldberger 1989) . The relationship between the Galton measure and the intergenerational correlation is given by
where σ y is the standard deviation of y. Let y be the natural logarithm of wealth, income or earnings. The standard deviation of y is a common measure of inequality. Thus, if inequality is unchanging across generations, so σ y p = σ y , then ρ y = β y . However, when inequality is changing across generations, the two measures diverge. The Galton measure exceeds ρ y when income inequality is rising but is less than ρ y when income inequality is declining. In effect, the Galton measure captures the normalized gross effect of parental income on offspring income independently of changes in the distribution of income, while the intergenerational correlation coefficient ρ adjusts for changes in the distribution of income. Also, ρ 2 measures the fraction of the variance in this generation's measure of economic success that is linearly associated with the same measure in the previous generation.
Estimates of the Galton measure are presented in Solon (this issue) as well as Mulligan (1997) and Solon (2000) . The mean estimates reported in Mulligan are: for consumption 0.68; for wealth 0.50; for income 0.43; for earnings (or wages) 0.34; and for years of schooling 0.29. The underlying studies indicate that persistence generally rises with age, is greater for sons than daughters, and is greater when multiple years of income or earnings are averaged. The importance of averaging multiple years to capture permanent aspects of economic status is dramatized in a recent study by Mazumder (2002) . He used a rich U.S. Social Security Administration data set to estimate a Galton coefficient of 0.27 averaging son's earnings over three years and father earnings averaged over two years. But the estimate increases to 0.47 when six years of the fathers earnings are averaged, and to 0.65 when fifteen years are averaged.
2 Evidence concerning trends in the degree of income persistence across generations is mixed, except that the period 1962-1973 experienced a substantial reduction in the intergenerational correlation of parental economic advantages and son's subsequent family income (Harding, Jencks, Lopoo and Mayer 2002) Does the fact that Mazumder's estimate that the intergenerational correlation coefficient for economic status is twice Galton's estimate for height mean that rags to riches is no more than a fantasy for most poor children? The Galton coefficient (or the intergenerational correlation) is a greatly oversimplified measure, and may be unilluminating about the probabilities of economic success conditional on being the child of poor, or rich or middling parents. Calculating these conditional probabilities and inspecting the entire transition matrix gives a more complete picture. The results of a study by Hertz (2001b) appear in Figure 1 with the parents arranged by income decile (from poor to rich moving from left to right) and with adult sons arranged by income decile along the other axis. The height of the surface indicates the likelihood of making the transition from the indicated parents' decile to the son's decile. Though the underlying intergenerational correlation of incomes is a modest 0.36, the differences in the likely life trajectories of the children of the poor and the rich are substantial. The "twin peaks" represent those stuck in poverty and affluence (though we do not expect the term "affluence trap" to catch on). Point D, for example, indicates that a son born to the top decile has better than a 1 in 5 chance to attain the top decile, while A indicates that for the son of the poorest decile the likelihood is one in a hundred. C indicates that sons of the poorest decile have a 19% probability of attaining the lowest decile. Hertz' transmission matrix and other studies (Corak and Heisz 1999 , Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson 1994 , Hertz 2001a suggest that distinct transmission mechanisms may be at work at various points of the income distribution. For example wealth bequests may play a major role at the top of the income distribution, while at the bottom vulnerability to violence or other adverse health episodes may be more important. 
Sources of Persistence: Cultural, Genetic and Bequest
The above evidence demonstrates a substantial level of persistence in income across generations. But it says nothing about the causal mechanisms at work. For this reason, our statistical estimates provide little guidance for policy, and do not even suggest whether or not one should be concerned about parent-child income similarity. We uncover the channels through which parental incomes influence offspring incomes by decomposing the intergenerational correlation (or the Galton coefficient) into additive components reflecting the contribution of a series of possible causal mechanisms. This will allow us to conclude, for example, that a certain fraction of the intergenerational correlation is accounted for by the genetic inheritance of IQ, or by the fact that the children of rich parents are also wealthy. It is a remarkable fact about correlation coefficients that this can be done, and unlike the seemingly analogous decomposition of variance explained in a stepwise regression as new variables are added, the technique we use does not require that we introduce variables in any particular order. To see why the decomposition is possible, suppose parents' income (measured by its logarithm, y p ) affects offspring income (also its logarithm, y) both directly and through channels x and z. Like any correlation coefficient, this intergenerational correlation can be expressed as the sum of the normalized regression coefficients of x, z and y p on y, each multiplied by the correlation between y p and the regressor (which, of course, for parental income itself is just 1) giving by:
The two indirect effects are just the estimated coefficients from a regression of offspring income on parental income, x and z, converted to standard deviation units of both variables (called normalized or standardized coefficients) multiplied by the correlation between the x and z variables and parental income. The direct effect is the normalized regression coefficient from the same regression. (This decomposition can be found in Goldberger (1991) or Blalock (1964) and is described in the Technical Note at the end of this paper.) As long as the multiple regression coefficients are unbiased, the decomposition is valid whatever the relationship among the variables. Specifically, it does not require that the variables x, z, and y p be uncorrelated. This decomposition allows us to be more precise about our 'black box' claim in the introduction. When we reported that the standard schooling, cognitive level, and other variables account for less than half of the observed parent offspring similarity of income, for instance, we mean that the direct parental effect is least half of the intergenerational correlation a number of studies allowing this comparison (Bowles 1972 , Bowles and Nelson 1974 , Atkinson et al. 1983 , Mulligan 1997 ).
Our strategy is to estimate the size of these direct and indirect effects. But what economic or other variables will play the role of our x and z? Anything about the offspring that is correlated with parents income and that affects the offspring's income, holding other influences on income constant, is a candidate. A plausible strategy is to look for attributes that exhibit strong parent-offspring similarities and that affect income in both generations. Thus x might be human capital and z wealth. The above decomposition can be repeated for the correlations between parental income and offspring income determining traits. For example, we can ask why parental income and offspring wealth are correlated. Is it bequests and inter-vivos transfers or the cultural transmission of savings behaviors, that account for this correlation?. Similarly, parent offspring similarity in human capital may be due to genetic or cultural inheritance of whatever it takes to persist in schooling and to acquire skills and behaviors that are rewarded in the labor market.
One of these paths deserves special attention not only because of its prima facie plausibility, but also because of the extraordinary attention given to this channel in popular discussions of the subject. This is the path from parents' income to offspring's cognitive functioning operating via genetic inheritance of IQ, coupled with the subsequent path from offspring IQ to labor market success.
The Role of Genetic Inheritance of Cognitive Skill
The similarity of parents' and offspring's scores on cognitive tests is well documented. Correlations of IQ between parents and offspring range from 0.42 to 0.72, where the higher figure refers to measures of average parental vs. average offspring IQ (Bouchard and McGue 1981, Plomin, DeFries, McClearn and McGuffin 2000) . The contribution of cognitive functioning to earnings both directly and via schooling attainment has also been established in a variety of studies that estimate determinants of earnings. The direct effect is estimated from studies that typically use the logarithm of earnings as a dependent variable, and analyze a variety of explanatory variables, including performance on a cognitive test, years (and perhaps other measures) of schooling, a measure of parental economic and/or social status, work experience, race, and sex. In U.S. data sets, the cognitive test score is often from the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), an instrument developed to predict vocational success. The indirect effect operating through schooling is estimated using measures of childhood IQ (along with other variables) to predict the level of schooling obtained.
We have located 65 estimates of the regression coefficient of a test score in an earnings equation in 24 different studies of U.S. data over a period of three decades. These appear in Figure 2 , where the vertical axis is the estimated coefficient and the horizontal axis gives the year to which the data apply. The mean of these estimates is 0.15, indicating that a standard deviation change in the cognitive score, holding constant the remaining variables (including schooling), changes the natural logarithm of earnings by about one-seventh of a standard deviation. By contrast, the mean value of the normalized regression coefficient of years of schooling in these studies is 0.22, suggesting a somewhat larger independent effect of schooling.
3 An estimate of the causal impact of childhood IQ on from years of schooling is 0.53 (Winship and Korenman 1999) (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2002) Do these two facts-parent child similarity in IQ and an important direct and indirect causal role for IQ in generating earnings-imply a major role for genetic inheritance of cognitive ability in the transmission of intergenerational economic status? One way to formulate this question is to ask how much lower would the intergenerational correlation be if there were no genetic inheritance of IQ, that is if the parent-offspring similarity in IQ were due entirely to cultural rather than genetic inheritance. This thought experiment is clearly hypothetical-if IQ were not genetically inherited it is likely that ceteris would not be paribus, namely, other relationships involved in this calculations would be affected-but it is informative nonetheless to do the calculation.
As we already have an estimate of the direct and indirect effects of IQ on earnings (the b = 0.266 calculated above), to answer our hypothetical question, we need just one more piece of information: how similar would parental and offspring IQ be if the sole source of the similarity were genetic transmission?
For this we need some genetics (the details are in the Technical Note below and in Bowles and Gintis (2001)), and a few terms-phenotype, genotype, heritability and the genetic correlation-unfamiliar to economists. A person's IQ-meaning, a test score-is a phenotypic trait, while the genes influencing IQ are the person's genotypic IQ. Heritability is the relationship between the two. Suppose that, for a given environment, a standard deviation difference in genotype is associated with a fraction h of a standard deviation difference in measured (that is, phenotypic) IQ. Then h 2 is the heritability of IQ. Estimates of h 2 are based on the degree of similarity of IQ among twins, siblings, cousins and others with differing degrees of biological relatedness. The value cannot be higher than 1, and most recent estimates are substantially lower (Devlin, Daniels and Roeder 1997 , Feldman, Otto and Christiansen 2000 , Plomin 1999 ). The genetic correlation is the degree of statistical association between genotypes of parents and children, which is 0.5 if the parents' genotypes are uncorrelated (random mating) and somewhat higher if parental genotypes are positively correlated (assortative mating).
Using the above method of decomposition, the correlation γ between parental and offspring IQ that is attributable to genetic inheritance of IQ alone is the heritability of IQ times the genetic correlation of 0.5 (assuming random mating) or γ = h 2 /2. The correlation between parent and offspring income attributable to genetic inheritance of IQ is simply this correlation, times the normalized path from IQ to earnings for the parents, times the analogous path for the offspring, or γ b 2 . (Another way to see this is to note that the correlation between parental income and offspring IQ which we would observe were the genetic inheritance of IQ the only channel at work is γ b, and this times the effect of offspring IQ on earnings, which is b, gives the same result). Using the values estimated above, we see that the contribution of genetic inheritance of IQ to the intergenerational transmission of income is (h 2 /2)(0.266) 2 = .035h 2 . Even if h were equal to one (which no one has ever suggested) the genetic inheritance of IQ would explain only a tenth or less of the intergenerational correlation of incomes. If the heritability of IQ were 0.5 (which may be a consensus estimate, if such a thing can be said to exist in this highly controversial field) and the genetic inheritance of IQ were the only mechanism ac-counting for the intergenerational income transmission, then the intergenerational correlation would not be between 0.33 and 0.67, but rather would be 0.018! To see what this means, assume that the parental and offspring incomes were bivariate normally distributed with a correlation of 0.018, then the likelihood that a child of the richest decile would attain the top income decile would exceed that of the poor by just twelve percent, rather than by the observed 20 times presented in Figure 1 .
Might the small contribution of genetic inheritance of IQ to parent offspring similarity of incomes be the result of measurement error in the cognitive measures. There are two issues here. First, what is the reliability of the test: whatever the test measures, does it measure well? Second, what is the validity of the test: does the test measure the right thing? The concern that the tests are a very noisy measure is entirely misplaced. In fact, the test measures used are among the more reliable variables used in standard earnings equations (reliability is measured by the correlation between tests and retests, between odd and even numbered items on the tests, and by more sophisticated methods.) For the AFQT, for example, the correlation between two test scores taken on successive days by the same person is likely to be higher than the correlation between the same person's reported years of schooling or income on two successive days.
The second concern, that the tests measure the wrong thing, is weightier. Could it be that cognitive skills not measured on existing test instruments are both highly heritable and have a major impact on earnings, thereby possibly explaining a more substantial fraction of the transmission process? The search for general cognitive measures that are substantially uncorrelated with IQ and predictive of success in adult roles began with Edward Thorndike's (1919) paper on "social intelligence." Some alternative test instruments, such as Robert Sternberg and collaborators'"practical intelligence" (Sternberg, Wagner, Williams and Horvath 1995, Williams and predict economic success in particular occupations. But despite the substantial fame and fortune that would have accrued to success in this area, the quest that Thorndike launched has yielded no robust alternative to IQ, let alone one that is highly heritable. Thus, the possible existence of economically important but as yet unmeasured heritable general cognitive skills cannot be excluded, but should at this stage be treated as pure speculation.
Indeed, we are inclined to think that available estimates overstate the importance of general cognitive skill as a determinant of earnings, since taking a test is more than a little like doing a job. Successful performance in either case results from a combination of ability and motivation, including the disposition to follow instructions, persistence, work ethic, and other traits likely to contribute independently to one's earnings. This is the reason we eschew the common label of a test score as 'cognitive skill' but rather use the more descriptive term 'cognitive performance'. Eysenck (1994, p. 9) , a leading student of cognitive testing, writes: " Low problem solving in an IQ test is a measure of performance; personality may influence performance rather than abstract intellect, with measurable effects on the IQ. An IQ test lasts for up to 1 hour or more, and considerations of fatigue, vigilance, arousal, etc. may very well play a part." Thus some of the explanatory power of the cognitive measure in predicting earnings does not reflect cognitive skill but rather other individual attributes contributing to the successful performance of tasks.
Genetic and Environmental Inheritance
The fact that the genetic inheritance of IQ explains little of the intergenerational transmission process says nothing about the possible importance of other genetically transmitted traits. Indeed, the remarkable income similarity of identical twins suggests that genetic effects may be important. We will use twin-similarity to estimate the genetic heritability of income as well as the environmental component of intergenerational transmission. But two words of caution are in order. First, our estimates are quite sensitive to variations in unobserved parameters, and unlike the case of IQ, for which we are able to reach a strong conclusion independently of the level of heritability, this is not the case for income. Second, it is sometimes mistakenly supposed that if the heritability of a trait is substantial and the environmental component of its variance small, then the trait cannot be affected much by changing the environments affecting its development. The fallacy of this view is dramatized by Galton's case of stature. The heritability of height estimated from U.S. twin samples is substantial (about 0.90, Plomin et al., 2000) . Moreover there are significant height differences among the peoples of the world: Dinka men in the Sudan average 5 feet and 11 inches-a bit taller than Norwegian and U.S. military servicemen and a whopping 8 inches taller than the Hadza hunter-gatherers in Southern Africa (Roderick Floud 1990):6. But the fact that Norwegian recruits in 1761 were shorter than today's Hadza shows that even quite heritable traits are sensitive to environments. What can be concluded from a finding that a small fraction of the variance of a trait is due to environmental variance is that policies to alter the trait through changed environments will require non-standard environments that differ from the environmental variance on which the estimates are based.
Consider the case of South Africa, where in 1993 roughly two-thirds of the intergenerational transmission of incomes was attributable to the fact that parents and children are of the same race, and race is a strong predictor of earnings (Hertz 2001a) . Because the traits designated by "race" are highly heritable and interracial parenting uncommon, this fact demonstrates a substantial role of genetic inheritance in the transmission process. Yet, it is especially clear in the case of South Africa that the economic importance of the genetic inheritance of physical traits derives from environmental influences. What makes the genetic inheritance of skin color and other racial markers central to the transmission process are matters of public policy, not human nature, including the very definition of races, racial patterns in marriage, and the discrimination suffered by nonwhites. Thus, the determination of the genetic component in a transmission process says little by itself about the extent to public policy can or should level a playing field. Genetic effects necessarily work through environments, many of which may be amenable to change through public policies.
Estimates of heritability use data on pairs of individuals with varying degrees of shared genes and environments. For example, identical and fraternal twins are exposed to similar environments during their upbringing but fraternal twins are only half as closely related genetically as are identical twins. Under quite strong simplifying assumptions (explained in the Technical Note) one can exploit the independent variation in genetic and environmental similarities among pairs of relatives to estimate heritability of a trait such as income, years of schooling or other standard economic variables. Taubman (1976) was the first economist to use this method. The fact that the incomes of fraternal twins are much less similar than identical twins can then be used to estimate the heritability of income. If an individual's income can be written income = h(genes) + β(environment) + idiosyncratic effects, and if within-pair genetic differences (for the fraternals) are uncorrelated with within-pair environmental differences (e.g., the good-looking twin does not get more loving attention), and if the environments affecting individual development are as similar for members of fraternal pairs of twins as for the identical twins pairs, then heritability (h 2 ) of income is twice the difference between the income correlations of identical and fraternal twins. As the difference between these two correlations is 0.2 in best data set available (the Swedish Twin Registry studied by Björklund, Jäntti, and Solon (2002a) and a smaller U.S. Twinsburg data set studied by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994)), we estimate h 2 to be 0.4. The estimate of h 2 tells us how correlated we would expect the identical twins income to be if there were no environmental effects. This is because they have the same genes and the normalized effect of these genes on each twin's income is h, which generates a correlation between the incomes of h 2 . Because the correlation of genes for the fraternal twins is one half, the implied correlation of fraternal twins' incomes is h 2 /2. The fact that the observed correlation of twins' income exceeds this estimate is explained by the fact that twins share similar environments. Thus, once we know h 2 , an assumption about the degree of similarity of these environments is then sufficient to estimate how large the environmental effects would have to be to generate the observed correlations. This procedure, assuming the correlation among the environments of twins (for both types) is 0.8, yields a value of β 2 of 0.20.
This estimate required some rather strong if's. The crucial assumption in the above technique is that the degree of similarity of environments shared by the fraternal twins (measured by a correlation coefficient, r fr e ) is no different from the identical twins (r id e ). But it is likely that identical twins share more similar environments than fraternal twins and other siblings (Loehlin and Nichols 1976) . This being the case, greater environmental differences may contribute to the greater dissimilarity of the fraternal twins, leading to an overestimate of heritability and an underestimate of the environmental effects. Just how sensitive the estimates are to reasonable variations in the assumptions concerning differences in the correlations of twins' environments is shown in Figure 3 . The Swedish Twin Registry data set assembled by Bjorklund et al. has data not just on twins, but on many pairs with varying degrees of relatedness (half siblings, for example) and may allow more robust estimates. If the estimates in the top row of Figure 3 were taken at face value, two striking conclusions would follow. The first is that a very substantial part of the observed correlation between parent and offspring income is due to the genetic inheritance, estimated as h 2 times the genetic correlation measuring parent-child genetic similarity, or about 1/2. This is surprising, in light of our negative findings concerning the inheritance of IQ. Even if the second row in the table is thought to be more reasonable, genetic inheritance would still make a sizeable contribution (namely, h 2 /2 = 0.12) to the intergenerational correlation. The second conclusion is that environmental effects are large. The normalized regression coefficient of environment on income implied by the top row's estimates is β = 0.45. This may be compared with the normalized regression coefficient for a measure of years of schooling in an earnings equation, the mean estimate of which in our meta analysis is just short of half of this magnitude, suggesting that while educational attainment captures important aspects of the relevant environments it is far from inclusive. If the correlation of parental income with the relevant environments captured by β is of the same magnitude as the correlation between parental permanent income and offspring years of schooling (namely, about 0.45) then the contribution of environmental differences to the intergenerational correlation is 0.45β, or 0.20, which coincidentally is exactly the magnitude of the genetic contribution. (If the second row of the above table is used, the environmental correlation is 0.28.) The two contributions-genetic and environmental-summed, namely, 0.40 give the implied intergenerational correlation.
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The surprising importance of both environment and genes point to a puzzle. If the genetic contribution is not strongly related to IQ and if the environmental contribution is twice the contribution of years of schooling what are the mechanisms accounting for persistence of income over the generations? We shall return to this puzzle, but will turn to data other than twin studies first, to show that the same puzzle arises.
Education
Because schooling attainment is persistent across generations and has clear links to skills and perhaps other traits that are rewarded in labor markets, an account of the transmission of intergenerational status based on human capital has strong prima facie plausibility. The data already introduced allow a calculation of the portion of the intergenerational income correlation accounted for by the fact that offspring of high-income parents get more schooling (measured in years). This is just the correlation of parent income and offspring schooling (about 0.45) multiplied by the normalized regression coefficient of schooling in an earnings equation (0.22 from our meta-analysis) or 0.10. This is a substantial contribution, particularly in light of the fact that it is restricted to the effects of years of schooling operating independently of IQ (because our estimate of 0.22 is from earnings functions including the AFQT test or a similar instrument). The full contribution, including IQ effects is 0.12.
Indeed, it was once commonly assumed that once adequate measures of schooling quality were developed, the only effects of parental economic status on offspring earnings would operate through effects on cognitive functioning and schooling, with the direct effect of parental status on offspring earnings vanishing. But even as the measurement of school quality has improved over the years, the estimated direct effect of parental incomes (or earnings) on offspring earnings has turned out to be remarkably robust. For example, Mulligan (1999) , using early 1990s data from the (U.S.) National Longitudinal Study of Youth, first estimated the effect of a change in the logarithm of parental earnings on offspring's logarithm of earnings without controlling for any other factors, and then controlled for a large number of measures of school quality, as well as the AFQT and standard educational and demographic variables. He found that between two-fifths and one-half of the gross (unconditional) statistical relationship of parental and offspring earnings remains even after controlling for the other factors. Similarly, Atkinson et al. (1983) find that twothirds or more of the substantial intergenerational transmission of income status between fathers and sons in the United Kingdom remains after controlling a range of measures of son's schooling. Bowles and Nelson (1974) found that between 33 and 60 percent of the covariation of parental economic status and offspring income was not accounted for by the statistical association of parental status with childhood IQ or years of schooling. These results just reaffirm the black box puzzle using entirely different data and methods: roughly half of the intergenerational transmission coefficient is unaccounted for. 
Wealth effects
One of the most widely believed channels by which economic success is passed on in the family is the inheritance of wealth as well as inter-vivos wealth transfers to children. Remarkably little scholarly attention has been given to this mechanism, in part because no representative panel data set exists for which the second generation has reached the age at which the inheritance of wealth typically occurs. The fact (above) that intergenerational persistence is greater for wealth than for earnings suggests that parent-offspring similarity in wealth may make a major contribution to the family persistence of income differences. If inheritances of wealth matter mainly for a small group at the top of the income distribution, and if inheritances of wealth also affect income levels, then there should be a higher level of intergenerational transmission of income for those with high incomes.
But these data say little about the role of inheritance of wealth per se or other transfers, and there is some reason to doubt an important role for this mechanism at least for most families. For most individuals and families, income from property constitutes a negligible fraction of their total income. Only among the very well to do is property a major source of income. Correspondingly, very few individuals receive inheritances of significant magnitude. Mulligan (1997) estimates that estates passing on sufficient wealth to be subject to inheritance tax in the United States constituted between 2 and 4 percent of deaths over the years 1960-1995. Even though this figure leaves out transfers that occur during life, which may be considerable, it seems unlikely that for most of the population a substantial degree of economic status is transmitted directly by the intergenerational transfer of property or financial wealth.
The intergenerational persistence of wealth is not explained simply by bequests and inter-vivos transfers, but reflects as well parent-offspring similarities in traits influencing wealth accumulation, such as orientation towards the future, sense of personal efficacy, work ethic, schooling attainment, and risk-taking. Some of these traits covary with the level of wealth: for example, less well-off people are more likely to be risk averse, to discount the future and have a low sense of efficacy (Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis 2000, Fong 2000) . Because of this correlation of wealth with the traits conducive to wealth accumulation, parent offspring similarity in wealth may arise from sources independent of any bequests or transfers.
A simple calculation suggests that, whatever their source, parent offspring wealth similarities can contribute a substantial fraction to the intergenerational persistence of incomes. Using the same decomposition methods as above this contribution is simply the correlation of parent income and child wealth times the normalized regression coefficient of wealth in an income equation. The parent income child wealth correlation probably lies between the intergenerational correlations for wealth and for income. Taking the midpoint of the averages reported above gives an estimate of 0.46. To get a rough idea of the normalized regression coefficient we need to know the percentage change in income associated with a one percent change in wealth; this elasticity will range from virtually zero (for those with little or no wealth) to one (for those with no source of income other than wealth). A plausible mean value for the U.S., based on either production function estimates or the capital share in income, is 0.20. We convert this to a normalized regression coefficient by multiplying by the ratio of the standard deviation of log wealth to the standard deviation of log income, which we take to be 2. These data suggest that the fact that higher income parents have wealthier children contributes 0.18 (that is, 0.46(.2)2) to the intergenerational correlation of incomes. A further decomposition-for which adequate date are not yet available-would allow us to say how much of the parental income-offspring wealth correlation is the result of inheritances, and how much from the other influences mentioned above. This estimate would have to be adjusted upwards to take account of the fact that those with greater wealth tend to have higher average returns to their wealth (Yitzhaki 1987) . Greater parental or own wealth may also raise the rate of return to schooling and other human investments, but we have no way of taking account of this empirically. For a sample of very rich parents the contribution of wealth effects to the intergenerational correlation would be much higher, of course, and perhaps explains the high persistence among the very rich Canadians found by Corak and Heisz. For a sample of families with very limited wealth the contribution would be nearly zero. The difference in the contribution of wealth effects across the income distribution is a reflection of the heterogeneous nature of the transmission process.
Group Membership and Personality
Thus far we have followed the production function approach, seeking to determine the contribution of parent-child similarity in ownership of factors of production to the intergenerational transmission of economic success. We have complemented the usual choice-based approach by including the influence of genetic inheritance. But other traits are persistent across generations and are arguably as important as determinants of income-for example, race, first language, number of children, number of siblings, and so on. Physical appearance is also an inherited non-skill trait that is a strong predictor of economic success. For example, obesity is a predictor of low earnings for women, while height predicts high earnings for men. Good looks predict high earnings for both men and women, the latter independently of whether they hold jobs interacting with the public. Bowles et al. (2002a) provide a survey of empirical evidence concerning these and many other nonskill determinants of economic success. While many of these traits are inherited from parents in at least one of the usual senses of vertical cultural transmission, bequest, and genetic transmission, in some cases parent-offspring similarity arises by other meanscommon nationality, for example.
Two such variables well illustrate the potential importance of nonskill factors in the intergenerational transmission of economic status: group membership and personality.
Suppose that economic success is influenced not only by a person's traits, but also by characteristics of the individuals with whom the person typically interacts. Suppose also that these interactions are not random, but are more likely to take place with individuals who share membership in a group. Groups may differ in a variety of dimensions: average level of schooling, economic success, cognitive functioning, and wealth level. Groups may be residential neighborhoods, ethnic or racial groups, linguistic groups, citizens of a nation, or any other set of individuals who typically interact more with one another than with those who do not share common membership. Group effects on economic success are well-documented and may arise for a number of reasons (Cooper et al. 1994 , Durlauf 1997 , Borjas 1995 , including discrimination, conformist effects on behavior, differential access to information, complementarities in production (a person's productivity is higher when working with better educated people, for example).
The influence of race on income, coupled with parent-child racial similarity, provides another type of group effect, as our example from South Africa illustrated. The importance of race in intergenerational transmission in the U.S. is suggested by the fact that the correlation among brothers' earnings estimated by Björklund, Eriksson, Jäntti, Raaum and Osterbacka (2002b) , namely 0.43, falls by 0.10 when the sample is restricted to whites. Suppose the similarity of brothers earnings were due solely to the fact that their parents have the same income (which they do, as they have the same parents). The square root of this correlation is the normalized regression coefficient of parental income on child income or 0.66, for the whole sample of brothers reported above and 0.57 for the racially homogeneous sample. The supposition is false of course, but using approximations of the importance of the other reasons why brothers incomes might be similar (their genetic similarity for example), suggests a still substantial difference between the degree of transmission of income from parent to child in the racially heterogeneous and the homogeneous samples, namely, 0.53 and 0.46 respectively. We take the difference between these two magnitudes as the contribution of race differences to the observed level of intergenerational transmission. A second example of traits not found in a production function that contribute to intergenerational status transmission are dispositions such as a sense of personal efficacy, work ethic, or a low time discount rate (strong orientation toward the future). These traits are not factors of production. Rather, they contribute to individual economic success because they increase the gains from exchange in situations where contracts are incomplete or where disequilibrium rents exist (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2001) . The importance of these aspects of personality stems from the fact that in an important class of exchanges, including the hiring of labor, borrowing and lending, or the exchange of goods of uncertain quality, it is impossible to specify all relevant aspects of the exchange in a contract enforceable by the courts. Where this is the case, the actual terms of the exchange are influenced by the degree of trust, honesty, hard work, and other dispositions of the parties to the exchange. A principal interacting with an impatient present-oriented agent will find it costly to provide strong incentives for the agent to comply with informal contractual provisions, for example. A very present-oriented employee will not value the promise of continued employment in the future, hence will require a higher wage to motivate hard work in the present, and hence is less likely to be employed. As another example, fatalistic workers who believe that the probability of job termination is unaffected by their own actions will be costly to motivate under this type of labor contract (Bowles et al. 2002a) . The empirical importance of these traits is suggested in a number of studies (Duncan and Dunifon 1998 , Heckman, Hsee and Rubinstein 2001 , Weinberger and Kuhn 2001 . Osborne (2000) has studied the economic importance and intergenerational persistence of fatalism, as measured by the Rotter Scale, a common measure of the degree to which individuals believe that important events in their lives are caused by external events rather than by their own actions. Her study of a sample of U.S men and their parents found that the Rotter Scale has a statistically significant and large influence on earnings and that the Rotter Scale is persistent from parents to offspring. (Of course the possibility that economic success is the cause of the Rotter score rather than the other way around has to be accounted for; Osborne used a Rotter score measured before the individual had any labor market experience at all to address this problem). The normalized influence of the Rotter Scale on income in Osborne's study is somewhat larger (in absolute value, namely −0.2) than the average influence of IQ on income in our metaanalysis of 65 studies presented in Figure 2 . The estimated contribution of the parental income child fatalism correlation (−0.14) to the intergenerational correlation is 0.03 (i.e., (−0.2) (−0.14) ). Osborne also studied a sample of women in the England and found that measures of social maladjustment taken at age eleven (the Bristol Social Adjustment Scale), such as aggression and withdrawal, are strong predictors of earnings at age 33. The normalized influence of personality traits of aggression and withdrawal on earnings is considerably larger than the influence of IQ. There are no measures of intergenerational persistence of personality traits in the Osborne's English data set, but other studies suggest that parent-child similarity in measures of social maladjustment may be quite high. For example Duncan, Kalil, Mayer, Tepper and Payne (2002) found that deviant forms of behaviors of U.S. mothers were strong predictors of the same behaviors in daughters, including drug use, violent behaviors, early sex, suspension from school and criminal convictions. Osborne's work thus suggests that the intergenerational transmission of personality traits (whether genetic or cultural) may be an important channel explaining the intergenerational persistence of income.
We know relatively little about the intergenerational transmission process for personality traits relevant to economic success, other than cognitive functioning. However Melvin Kohn's (1969) study of child-rearing values of parents suggests that at least for some traits, experiences in the workplace are generalized and passed on to children by the process of vertical cultural transmission. Kohn categorizes his adult sample by the degree of self-determination that each experiences on the job, ranging from those who are relatively unsupervised to those who are closely directed by superiors. Kohn found that parents with high levels of occupational self-direction emphasize curiosity, self-control, happiness and independence as values for their children, while those who are closely monitored by supervisors at work emphasize conformity to external authority. Kohn concluded: "Whether consciously or not, parents tend to impart to their children the lessons derived from their own social class and thus help prepare their children for a similar class position." Kohn did not measure the effects of parental values on their behaviors as parents, or effects on child development. However, the work by Osborne does suggest that the degree of self-direction has significant effects on earnings later in life. Recent work byYeung, Hill and Duncan (2000) shows that parental behavior, including church attendance, membership in social organizations, and such precautionary behavior as seat belt usage, have significant impacts on their children's earnings.
Conclusion
Recent evidence points to a much higher level of intergenerational transmission of economic position than was previously thought to be the case. America may still be the land of opportunity by some measures, but parental income and wealth are strong predictors of the likely economic status of the next generation.
Our main objective has been to assess the extent of intergenerational transmission and the mechanisms accounting for it. Figure 4 summarizes our best estimates of the relative importance of the main causal channels we have been able to identify. (The only entry not previously explained is the first, which is just an estimate of the parental income-child IQ correlation times our estimate of the normalized effect of IQ on earnings, conditioned on, among other things, years of schooling.) While the estimates in Figure 4 are imprecise the qualitative results are not likely to be affected by reasonable alternative methods. They are somewhat surprising: wealth, race and schooling are important, but IQ is not a major contributor and the genetic transmission of IQ is even less important. Taking account of the fact that the children of the well to do are much healthier than poor children (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson 2001) along with the fact that poor health has substantial effects on incomes later in life especially after middle age (Smith 1999) would probably account for a substantial part of the intergenerational transmission process. The role of health in the process is particularly striking because parental incomes appears to have strong impacts on child health that are not accounted for by either the health status of the parents or the genetic similarity between parents and children.
A policy maker who is concerned about intergenerational transmission of economic status will face two difficult sets of issues. First, many of the policies that might affect the intergenerational transmission of economic status are controversial. For example, the current political climate seems inhospitable to increasing the estate tax to limit intergenerational financial transfers. Eliminating racial discrimination would reduce one component of the heritability of income, but achieving this goal is difficult. Improving educational achievement, especially for those whose parents have relatively low levels of schooling, would reduce intergenerational transmission both directly, because of the impact of schooling, and perhaps also indirectly by providing a more open network of group memberships and mating choices that are less homogeneous by income class. But improving educational achievement is The main causal channels operative in intergenerational status transmission in the U.S. For each channel, the entry is the correlation of parent income with the indicated predictor of offspring income, multiplied by its normalized regression coefficient in an income equation. The total is the intergenerational correlation resulting from these channels, in the absence of a direct effect of parents' status on offspring status. Source: calculations described in text.
another goal that is easier stated than accomplished. A second broad set of problems is normative. Does a level playing field entail no correlation between parental and child incomes? And if it did, how could we balance the claims of fairness against the costs of high levels of downward mobility among people who are strongly loss-averse which this would entail, not to mention the competing claims of privacy and the value of family life that would be compromised by any attempt to simply disconnect the fortunes of parents and children. Rather than pursuing an abstract (and to our minds unattractive) objective of zero intergenerational correlation, a better approach might be to ask: which mechanisms of intergenerational transmission are unfair, and direct policies accordingly. The role of race in transmitting status from generation to generation is clearly unfair, most people regard the strong parental income, child health connection as morally suspect, and many feel the same way about wealth inheritance, for example. Other mechanisms of persistence-the genetic inheritance of good looks, for example-strike most people as unobjectionable and not an appropriate target for compensatory policy interventions (a beauty tax?) while large majorities favor policies to compensate for inherited disabilities.
Addressing the policy challenge will require not only moral clarity about these and related issues, but a better accounting of which causal mechanisms are at work in producing the substantial levels of intergenerational persistence of economic differences.
Technical Note: Decomposing Correlation Coefficients and Estimating Heritability
Suppose parental income y p directly affects offspring income y, but offspring income is also affected by two variables, x and z, that are correlated with parental income. Then if r y p x and r y p z are the correlations of parental income with x and z, respectively, and if the normalized regression coefficients of y p , x, and z on y are given by β y p y , β xy , and β zy , respectively, we have r y p y = β y p y + r y p x β xy + r y p z β xy .
This is the correlation between parental and offspring income, decomposed into its direct effect (the first term), the effect via variable x (the second term), and the effect via variable z (the third term). We can now apply this method to the estimation of heritability. Suppose an attribute x i of individual i depends linearly on genetic endowment g i , environmental influence e i , and an error term i . We write this as
If we normalize x i , g i , and e i , as they vary over all individuals in the population, to have zero mean and unit variance, we call h 2 the heritability of the trait x. Now take two individuals, say i = 1, 2, and let r x , r e , and r g be the correlation between their x-traits, their environments, and their genetic endowments, respectively. If we assume that within a given family g and e are uncorrelated, and the error terms are uncorrelated with each other and with the other dependent variables, from (4a) we have 
where E is the expectation operator. Suppose the degree of similarity of the twins' environments, r e , is independent of whether they are identical or fraternal, so r Figure 3 . Accounting for assortative mating makes little difference in the estimates. The analysis here assumes that the effect of genes and environment on income are independent of the levels of each (4a). While common in behavioral genetics, the assumption is quite strong, and a nonlinear model may be more appropriate, see Goldberger (1979) , Jencks (1980) , and Dickens and Flynn (2001) . 
